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1. INTRODUCTION
The European Union (EU) will be enlarged to
10 new Member-States in May 2004. Upon acces-
sion to the EU, these countries are required to treat
their exchange rate policies as a matter of common
interest and to pursue price stability as the pri-
mary objective of monetary policy. In addition, the
new Member States have committed to adopt the
euro upon the fulfilment of the required conver-
gence criteria. Against this background, many ac-
ceding countries have signalled their intention to
join the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II)(1).
The mechanism can provide a useful framework
for the conduct of monetary and exchange rate
policies in the new Member States and is also a
precondition for joining the euro.
This article reviews the experience of the Portu-
guese escudo in the exchange rate mechanism
(ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS),
the precursor of ERM II. The Portuguese experi-
ence will hopefully provide a useful point of refer-
ence for the acceding countries as they consider
applying for ERM II membership. Section 2 dis-
cusses the background to the decision to apply for
ERM membership. Section 3 describes the man-
agement of the escudo in the ERM, highlighting
three distinct periods. The first period corresponds
to the early months of participation in the system,
from April to the summer 1992, i.e. the last phase
of the “hard EMS”. The second period coincided
with the ERM crisis, which started in the summer
of 1992 and ultimately led to a widening of the
fluctuation bands to +15 per cent in August 1993.
Finally, the third period, from the enlargement of
the ERM bands to the end of 1998, was one of in-
creasing stability in the run-up to Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU). Section 4 concludes.
2. BACKGROUND TO THE DECISION TO JOIN
THE ERM
The decision to join the exchange rate mecha-
nism of the European Monetary System should be
seen in the context of the exchange rate-based dis-
inflation strategy implemented by the Portuguese
authorities as from the mid-1980s(2). In 1984, after a
decade of severe macroeconomic instability in
which two stabilisation packages had to be negoti-
ated with the IMF, inflation was running at 30 per
cent, and the inflation differential vis-à-vis the EU
exceeded 20 percentage points (p.p.) (Chart 1A). In
this period, monetary policy was based on capital
controls, credit ceilings and administered interest
rates, and there was extensive recourse to mone-
tary financing of budget deficits. Exchange rate
policy followed a crawling-peg aimed at preserv-
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(1) ERM II was set up by the Resolution of the European Council
of 16 June 1997 to replace the European Monetary System that
had been created in 1979. It is a multilateral arrangement of
fixed, but adjustable, exchange rates with a central rate estab-
lished against the euro and a standard fluctuation band of + 15
per cent. Formally agreed fluctuation bands narrower than the
standard one may be set at the request of the non-euro area
Member State concerned. (2) See Abreu (2001) on the Portuguese disinflation experience.ing the competitiveness of Portuguese exporters in
the context of high and chronic current account
deficits. The crawling-peg had been introduced in
August 1977, a few months before the implemen-
tation of the first IMF stabilisation package, and
consisted of a pre-announced monthly deprecia-
tion rate of the escudo vis-à-vis a basket of 13 cur-
rencies. Up to 1983, a number of discrete devalua-
tions have also taken place(3). The country was
trapped in a vicious circle of inflation and devalu-
ation. The poor economic performance of the
1970s and early 1980s made it clear that a regime
shift focusing on macroeconomic stability and
structural reform would be needed to put the
economy on a sustainable growth path. Accord-
ingly, in the mid-1980s, an ambitious economic
programme aimed at sustained disinflation, bud-
getary consolidation and wide-ranging structural
reform was put in place. The implementation of
the 1983 IMF stabilisation package had balanced
the current account and had put inflation and the
general government deficit on a declining path.
The country’s integration in the European Union
in 1986 provided the catalyst for the implementa-
tion of the reform programme.
The exchange rate was chosen as the central
piece in the disinflation strategy, a natural choice
for a small open-economy like the Portuguese one.
In this context, the monthly rate of depreciation of
the escudo was gradually cut down since 1986,
and no more discrete devaluations were carried
out. Initially, inflation declined very rapidly with
annual consumer price increases moving from a
peak of 29.3 per cent in 1984 to 9.3 per cent in 1987.
This deceleration of prices, which took place in a
context of strong economic growth (Chart 1B),
benefited from extremely favourable international
price developments, as well as from the slack that
had emerged in the economy following the imple-
mentation of the 1983 stabilisation package. In the
late 1980s, however, inflation resumed an upward
trend, reflecting increasing signs of overheating in
the economy, as well as less favourable interna-
tional prices. As the monthly rate of devaluation of
the Portuguese escudo continued to be reduced,
the inflation differential against Portugal’s main
trading partners was no longer fully compensated,
and the currency started appreciating in real terms
(Chart 2A).
In the late 1980s, in the context of the gradual
liberalisation of capital outflows and inflows, the
monetary authorities experienced increasing diffi-
culties in controlling domestic liquidity. The at-
tractiveness of the Portuguese economy had
greatly improved after EU accession, reflecting
better economic prospects and the commitment to
an investment-friendly economic and political en-
vironment. The corresponding (permanent) de-
cline in the country’s risk premium attracted sig-
nificant amounts of foreign direct investment. In
























































Sources: INE and European Commission.
(3) Discrete devaluations were announced on 5 May 1978 (-6.1 per
cent); 16 June 1982 (-9.4 per cent); 23 March 1983 (-2.0 per cent)
and 22 June 1983 (-12.0 per cent). One discrete re-valuation has
taken place on 12 February 1980 (+6.0 per cent).addition, a large interest rate differential vis-à-vis
the core European currencies, coupled with a
tightly managed (and thus highly predictable) ex-
change rate in the context of the crawling-peg re-
gime, fostered massive inflows of short-term capi-
tal. The central bank was caught in a vicious circle,
as it tried to simultaneously control domestic in-
terest rates and the exchange rate. Foreign ex-
change interventions to contain the pressure to-
wards the appreciation of the escudo increased do-
mestic liquidity, impairing the effectiveness of
credit ceilings.
The interruption of the disinflation process in
the late 1980s, and the difficulties in controlling
domestic liquidity, prompted radical changes in
the conduct of monetary and exchange rate poli-
cies in the early 1990s. A system of market-based
liquidity management was implemented, and con-
trols to capital inflows were temporarily re-
imposed(4). In addition, the crawling-peg regime
was abandoned, and the escudo was allowed to
fluctuate within an undisclosed band against a
basket composed of the five main ERM currencies
as from October 1990(5). This regime shift was in-
tended to enhance the anti-inflationary stance of
monetary policy. The authorities wished to intro-
duce some short-term unpredictability in the ex-
change rate of the escudo, so as to discourage
short-term capital inflows. The new policy strat-
egy was also aimed at preparing the country for
the future participation in the ERM.
The new regime failed to discourage capital in-
flows since, as before, the Banco de Portugal con-
tinued to impose high domestic interest rates to
fight inflation, while at the same time intervening
in the foreign exchange market to contain the pres-
sure towards the appreciation of the Portuguese
escudo(6). In an environment characterised by
strong optimism regarding the prospects for the
creation of a monetary union in Europe, and by fa-
vourable prospects for the Portuguese economy,
investors saw the Portuguese currency as a “one
way bet”(7). In spite of the massive sales of escudos
by the Banco de Portugal — the central bank’s net
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Chart 2A







































Inflation differential PT-EU (p.p.)
PTE effective depreciation (%)
Chart 2B
INFLATION DIFFERENTIAL
AND PTE EFFECTIVE DEPRECIATION
(4) In July 1990, a compulsory non-remunerated deposit amount-
ing to 40 per cent of foreign borrowing by Portuguese residents
was introduced. One year later, restrictions were re-imposed
on the purchase of floating-rate Portuguese securities by non-
residents.
(5) These currencies were the German mark, Sterling, the French
franc, the Italian lira and the Spanish peseta.
(6) The Banco de Portugal sold escudos in the foreign exchange
market to prevent an excessive appreciation of the currency
that would harm competitiveness. Foreign exchange interven-
tions increased domestic liquidity putting downward pressure
on domestic interest rates. The Banco de Portugal would then
try to dry up excess liquidity through open-market operations,
further stimulating capital inflows.
(7) A similar phenomenon affected the high-yielding ERM curren-
cies. At the time, investors believed that ERM countries were
on a sustainable convergence path towards monetary union, so
that interest rate differentials in favour of the higher yielding
currencies significantly overestimated the actual risk of ex-
change rate depreciation. This phenomenon came to be known
as “the convergence play” (see IMF (1993)).
Sources: European Commission and Banco de Portugal.foreign assets peaked at over 25 per cent of GDP in
1991 (Chart 3) — the nominal effective exchange
rate appreciated by almost 3 per cent in the 18
months that followed the abolition of the crawl-
ing-peg. Given that the inflation differential
against the EU average was still significant, this
translated into a substantial real appreciation of
the currency (Chart 1A and 2B). The conduct of
monetary policy in this period was further compli-
cated by the expansionary stance of fiscal policy(8),
which added to the strong growth of private sector
expenditure, giving rise to an increasingly unbal-
anced policy-mix. In spite of the difficulties in run-
ning monetary policy, inflation resumed a down-
ward path in 1991, as high domestic real interest
rates and the appreciation of the currency helped
contain price pressures.
In April 1992, the Portuguese government ap-
plied for ERM membership(9). Participation in the
ERM did not seem a radical departure from the ex-
change rate policy being followed since October
1990. However, the formal commitment to keeping
the escudo within a pre-established band was ex-
pected to reinforce the medium-term credibility of
the Portuguese authorities’ anti-inflation stance,
and to have a favourable impact on inflation ex-
pectations. Indeed, exchange rate stability vis-à-vis
a set of currencies characterised by a high degree
of nominal stability should provide a powerful an-
chor to reach and maintain price stability over the
medium-run(10). ERM membership was also a nec-
essary step to ensure that the country would be a
candidate for participation in EMU. The
Maastricht Treaty had been signed just two
months before, and participation in the exchange
rate mechanism was one of the eligibility criteria
for EMU(11).
The escudo formally joined the ERM on 6 April
1992. The central rate against the ECU was set at
178.735 escudos per ECU, implying a 1.4 per cent
devaluation vis-à-vis the prevailing market rate.
The central parity against the German currency,
which was effectively the anchor of the system,
was set at 86.9393 escudos per German mark. The
Portuguese currency joined the then-called wide
band, which allowed for a + 6 per cent fluctuation
of the market rate around the bilateral central rates
against the other ERM currencies. The entry rate in
the ERM was broadly in line with available esti-
mates for the escudo’s equilibrium real exchange
rate(12). The strong performance of the external sec-
tor since the mid-1980s, as evidenced by the mar-
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(8) After significant progress towards budgetary consolidation up
to 1989, fiscal policy became clearly expansionary in 1990-91, as
illustrated by the cumulative decline of the cyclically-adjusted
primary balance of close to 3 percentage points of GDP be-
tween 1989 and 1991. For an account of fiscal policy in the pe-
riod 1986-1994, see Cunha and Neves (1995).
(9) The fact that Portugal was holding the EU Presidency in the
first semester of 1992 — indeed for the first time since the
country had joined the Union — was probably an important
consideration in the authorities’ decision to apply for ERM
membership at that particular moment, as such a move in-
creased the visibility of the government’s commitment to the
process of European integration.
(10)Somewhat paradoxically, as the experience of the Spanish pe-
seta had made clear, ERM accession implied some risks to the
pursuit of the disinflation process. Indeed, participation in the
system would impose easier monetary conditions at a time
when the inflation differential against the EU was still substan-
tial (in excess of 5 p.p.), and domestic demand was still seen to
be growing fast.
(11)Article 121 of the Treaty on European Union (former Article
109j), set as one of the criteria for EMU participation “the ob-
servance of the normal fluctuation margins provided for by
the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary Sys-
tem, for at least two years, without devaluing against the cur-
rency of any other member state”. At the time, the common
wisdom was that the “normal fluctuation margins” corre-
sponded to the so-called narrow bands (+ 2.25 per cent).
(12)Manteu and Mello (1992) provide an estimate for the path of
the fundamental real equilibrium exchange rate of the Portu-
guese escudo in the period 1980-1992. Later studies reported






























Sources: European Commission and Banco de Portugal.ket share gains of Portuguese exporters and a bal-
anced current account, suggested that the steep
real appreciation of the currency in the previous
years had been, at least to a large extent, an equi-
librium phenomenon(13).
3. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE PTE IN THE ERM
This section reviews the management of the es-
cudo in the ERM. Charts 4 to 6 present an over-
view of the most relevant variables in the period
1992-98. Charts 4A and B depict developments in
the PTE/DEM exchange rate, as well the behaviour
of the money market overnight interest rate and
daily foreign exchange market interventions. Since
foreign exchange interventions data are not pub-
licly available, an intervention index was com-
puted as in Adão and Pina (2003)(14). The
volatilities of both the PTE/DEM exchange rate
and the escudo overnight interest rate are shown
in Chart 5. Finally, Chart 6A and B presents the
short and long-term interest rates of the Portu-
guese escudo and the German mark(15).
The period of ERM membership can be divided
into three sub-periods. The first corresponds to the
early months of participation in the system, from
April to the summer 1992, i.e. the last phase of the
“hard EMS”. In this period the trends that had
prevailed in the previous years continued to apply,
i.e., strong inflows of foreign capital attracted by
high interest rate differentials put upward pres-
sure on the escudo and complicated the manage-
ment of domestic liquidity. The second period
lasted about one year and was the most turbulent
one. It coincided with the ERM crisis, which
started in the summer of 1992, and ultimately led
to a widening of the fluctuation bands to + 15 per
cent in August 1993. In this period, the central par-
ity of the escudo was devalued twice, and the Por-
tuguese currency depreciated by about 10 per cent
in effective terms and by twice as much against
the German mark. The third period, which runs
from the enlargement of the ERM bands to the end
of 1998, is one of increasing stability in the run-up
to the EMU. The stability of the exchange rate in
this period is attested by the fact that, in spite of a
third realignment of the central parity of the es-
cudo, the escudo’s conversion rate into euro was
very close to the average PTE/DEM market rate
prevailing in August 1993.
The ERM crisis and the related depreciation the
Portuguese escudo did not prevent a steady de-
cline of the inflation rate in the period of ERM
membership. Average CPI inflation declined from
10.8 per cent in 1991 to 2.2 per cent in 1997. The
transmission of the exchange rate depreciation of
1992/93 to tradables prices appears to have been
rather limited, suggesting that the realignments of
the Portuguese escudo were not regarded as a re-
gime shift. Moreover, a significant deterioration of
the cyclical position in the second half of 1992 and
in 1993 in the context of the recession in the EU
has put non-tradables inflation on a clear down-
ward path. When the economy re-bounded from
1994 onwards, the successful preservation of ex-
change rate stability since the enlargement of the
bands anchored inflation expectations allowing for
continued disinflation.
3.1. The early months: a continuation
of the previous trends
After joining the ERM, the escudo became the
strongest currency in the parity grid, and reached
the ceiling against the weakest currency in the sys-
tem, which at the time was the British Pound. Ref-
erence rates for regular money market interven-
tion were reduced with the aim of easing the up-
ward pressure on the escudo (Table 1) and the
Banco de Portugal had to make frequent purchases
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(13)The process of financial integration and the associated decline
in the country’s risk premium, as well as the inflows related to
the Community structural funds, played an important role in
explaining the equilibrium appreciation of the Portuguese cur-
rency. For a survey of the arguments pointing to an equilib-
rium appreciation of the Portuguese escudo, see Manteu and
Neves (1998).
(14)The intervention index corresponds to the ratio between daily
intervention figures and the highest absolute value of daily in-
terventions in the period of ERM membership (which occurred
on 16 September 1992) times 100. A positive value for the in-
dex corresponds to a purchase of escudos (i.e., a sale of foreign
currency) by the Banco de Portugal. Interventions include the
so-called “re-chanelling operations, which correspond to sales
of foreign currency that the central bank had from the Trea-
sury and that originated from Community transfers, or from
the issuance of foreign currency denominated public debt.
(15)Two annexes are provided as background material: Annex 1
presents a chronology of the Portuguese escudo experience in
the ERM, and Annex 2 contains a comprehensive list of the
changes to the Banco de Portugal money market intervention
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INTEREST RATE AND EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY OF THE PTEof foreign currency in order to keep the escudo
within the band (Chart 7).
On 13 August, in accordance with the guide-
lines set by the government, the Banco de Portugal
announced that all remaining capital controls
would be gradually lifted until the end of the
year(16). The announcement of full capital move-
ment liberalisation was accompanied by a further
(and rather significant) cut in official interest rates
in order to prevent capital inflows from increasing
even more. In two stages (August 12 and 19), the
Banco de Portugal reduced the reference rate for
the regular provision of liquidity by 1.75 p.p. to 16
per cent, bringing the cumulative decline of this
rate to 3 p.p. since ERM entry. The rate for the reg-
ular absorption of liquidity was reduced to 14 per
cent, a 1.6 p.p. decline since ERM accession. The
completion of capital movement liberalisation
made a further (unwarranted) easing of monetary
conditions inevitable. In the Press Release an-
nouncing the liberalisation process, the Banco de
Portugal pointed out that the decision to fully lib-
eralise capital movements virtually eliminated the
room for manoeuvre of domestic monetary policy.
Accordingly, quantitative guidelines for the do-
mestic liquidity would cease to be announced, as
official interest rates would have to be exclusively
used to ensure that the exchange rate was kept
within the ERM fluctuation bands. Against this
background, the contribution of monetary policy













































































































AND PTE OVERNIGHT INTEREST RATE
6 April 1992 to 20 August 1992
(16)The restrictions in force at the time were to be dismantled in
stages. From the end of August onwards, open access to exter-
nal borrowing would be permitted, with the abolition of the
compulsory deposit requirement (the rate of which had been
progressively reduced since March); from the end of October,
purchase by non-residents of indexed-rate debt securities
would be liberalised; and lastly, from the end of the year, non-
residents would be allowed access to the domestic money mar-
ket. These measures had been preceded by the lifting of restric-
tions on purchases of short-term foreign securities by residents
at the beginning of August. See the Banco de Portugal Press




































































































































(a) Money market management relied upon regular intervention
operations aimed at the absorption or the provision of li-
quidity through fixed rate tenders (with one week maturity,
corresponding to the minimum reserve maintenance period).
Fine-tuning operations and a late credit facility allowing ac-
cess to funds at a penalty rate on the last day of the mini-
mum reserve maintenance period were also available.to the disinflation process would be reduced, im-
plying the need for stronger efforts from the fiscal
policy side in achieving nominal convergence.
3.2. The ERM crisis (Summer 1992-August 1993)(17)
After the initial period of strong performance in
the system, the escudo started to fall to the lower
half of its fluctuation band. This development re-
sulted from a combination of domestic and exter-
nal factors. On the domestic front, the marked de-
cline of official interest rates since ERM accession,
which took place in a context of (temporarily) in-
creasing inflation, created a perception of incom-
patible internal and external policy require-
ments(18). On the external side, the loss of credibil-
ity of the ERM after the Danish rejection of the
Maastricht Treaty in early June 1992 led to a signif-
icant increase of the risk-premia of the currencies
from the countries with the worst macroeconomic
stability track records, causing a massive shift out
of those currencies. Difficulties in the ERM were
compounded by the appreciating trend of the Ger-
man mark against the US dollar in international
markets(19).
Against this background, the escudo found it-
self under heavy selling pressure from August 21
onwards. The Banco de Portugal resorted to the
three Basle-Nyborg instruments to defend the cur-
rency(20). The exchange rate was allowed to slide
within its fluctuation band, but was prevented
from reaching the lower limit. The escudo depreci-
ated by around 2.4 per cent against the German
currency in the week of August 17 to 24. For the
first time in many years, the Banco de Portugal
had to carry out significant interventions in de-
fence of the escudo, and in less than two weeks the
amount of foreign currency that was spent in de-
fence of the escudo had fully offset the reserves ac-
cumulated since ERM entry. Less than full sterili-
sation of intervention operations put upward pres-
sure on money market interest rates, and the over-
night rate increased almost 3 p.p. from August 21
to August 25 (Chart 8).
Mounting tensions in the ERM led toa7p e r
cent devaluation of the Italian lira on September
13, the first ERM realignment in more than five
years(21). Three days later, on September 16, the
Italian lira, the British pound, the Spanish peseta
and the Portuguese escudo suffered a severe spec-
ulative attack. As a consequence, British member-
ship of the ERM was suspended; the Italian au-
thorities “temporarily” suspended their foreign
exchange market intervention obligations and the
peseta’s central rate was devalued by 5 per cent.
The Banco de Portugal managed to counter the at-
tack on the escudo and to keep the currency well
within the band. Massive interventions were car-
ried out in defence of the escudo(22) and regular in-
tervention operations in the domestic money mar-
ket were suspended and replaced by the provision
of fixed amounts of liquidity through interest rate
auctions (Annex 2). The average overnight interest
rate in the domestic money market increased sub-
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(17)On the ERM crisis and the reaction of the Portuguese authori-
ties, see IMF (1993), Banco de Portugal, Annual Reports 1992
and 1993, Bento and Gaspar (1993) and Bento (1995).
(18)The year-on-year CPI inflation increased from 8.0 per cent in
February 1992 to 9.5 per cent in June 1992, reflecting an in-
crease in indirect taxes. A declining trend resumed thereafter.
(19)The ERM had undergone a brief period of tension towards the
end of 1991. At the time, domestic developments in Germany
(i.e., increasing inflation pressures linked to the re-unification
process) pointed to the need of tighter monetary conditions,
whereas in most other ERM countries a deceleration of eco-
nomic activity pressed towards lower interest rates. These de-
velopments occurred at a time when the scope for a further re-
duction of interest rate differentials amongst ERM currencies
had become rather limited. Tensions in the ERM were fuelled
by rumours of a realignment prior to the agreement on the
Maastricht Treaty, and a depreciating trend of the US dollar
vis-à-vis the German mark. When the Bundesbank increased its
discount rate by 0.5 p.p on 19 December (after the Maastricht
European Council), the move was followed by all ERM coun-
tries except the UK. This course of action, together with the
agreement on Economic and Monetary Union reached at
Maastricht and a recovery of the dollar restored calm condi-
tions in the ERM. The pound sterling, however, remained
weak, reflecting the British authorities’ decision not to raise in-
terest rates.
(20)The Basle-Nyborg Agreement of September 1987 introduced
several improvements in the management of the ERM. In par-
ticular, the agreement called for a more active, flexible and con-
certed use of three instruments for defending a currency suffer-
ing from unwarranted speculative pressure: changes in interest
rate differentials: a flexible use of the fluctuation margins and
foreign exchange market interventions. See the Communiqué
by EC Ministers of Economics and Finance of September 12,
1987, reproduced in Ungerer et al (1990).
(21)The only exception was the adjustment of the central rate of the
lira in January 1990, when this currency moved from the wide
to the narrow band keeping its lower intervention limits un-
changed.
(22)The maximum (absolute) value of daily interventions was re-
corded on September 16.stantially, peaking at 68.4 per cent on September
24.
The defence of the escudo was facilitated by the
fact that controls on capital outflows were still in
force, even if they had been a non-active restriction
for many years. In particular, short-term bank
lending in domestic currency to non-residents was
not allowed, including in the form of overdrafts.
Given that speculation mainly originated from
non-residents, the enforcement of existing controls
allowed a partial insulation of the domestic money
market from the interest rate costs of defending
the escudo. In the euro-escudo market, the large
scale of (short) sales of escudos by non-residents
translated into strong demand for funds as specu-
lators had to settle their transactions. In order to
prevent a disruption of the payments system, ex-
isting restrictions were activated through prices
rather than quantities. The Banco de Portugal pro-
vided funds directly to the euro-escudo market
through foreign currency swaps at discouraging
rates, which increased with the amount demanded
by the market(23). The tom/next rate exceeded 1000
per cent on September 18 and September 21. The
levels reached by euro-escudo interest rates
prompted speculators to quickly cover their short
positions in escudos (mainly created during the
major speculative attack of 15-17 September). This
temporarily pushed the exchange rate towards the
upper limit of the fluctuation band on September
21, when the escudo appreciated by 4 per cent
against the DEM. The high interest rates paid to fi-
nance short positions, and the price paid to cover
those positions imposed heavy losses on specula-
tors. Overall, and despite significant volatility
within the month, the average nominal effective
exchange rate of the Portuguese escudo remained
stable in September 1992 relative to August. The
average overnight rate, however, increased sub-
stantially, from 15 to 24 per cent, as did the
3-month interest rate differential against the DEM,
which climbed from 4.5 to 9.2 p.p., reflecting a
marked increase in the risk premium of the Portu-
guese currency (Chart 6).
In October 1992 tensions in the ERM eased
somewhat. Net capital flows out of the escudo per-
sisted, and the Banco de Portugal continued to in-
tervene in the foreign exchange market in support
of the currency, although in a much smaller scale
than before. The aim was to avoid an excessive
volatility of the exchange rate. Regular liquidity
absorption was resumed on October 12, while the
rate applying to the regular provision of liquidity
remained suspended. In the first half of Novem-
ber, as the situation in the ERM stabilised further,
intervention in the foreign exchange market be-
came unnecessary.
On November 19, however, as the ECU peg of
the Swedish Krona was abandoned(24), heavy sell-
ing pressure re-emerged against several ERM cur-
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(23)In addition, on 24 September, the restriction on bank lending in
domestic currency to non-residents was enforced by subjecting
banks engaging in such lending to borrow an equivalent
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requested a new devaluation of the Spanish pe-
seta’s central rate. In this context, the Portuguese
authorities decided that the central parity of the
escudo should also be adjusted, and both curren-
cies’ central rates were devalued by 6 per cent. The
authorities emphasised that the realignment of the
escudo was not intended to mark a departure
from the policy of exchange rate stability, but
rather to provide the authorities with some room
for manoeuvre in the context of difficult foreign
exchange market conditions(25). Accordingly, the
central bank kept buying escudos in the foreign
exchange market, and tightened liquidity condi-
tions in the domestic and euro-escudo money mar-
kets. The regular liquidity absorption operations
were once again suspended in the few days after
the realignment. By acting in this manner, the
Banco de Portugal intended both to limit the im-
pact of the realignment on the anti-inflationary
stance of monetary policy and to prevent specula-
tors from profiting from the short escudo positions
established before the realignment. As a result, the
realignment involved a downward shift of the
band, but not an immediate depreciation of the
market exchange rate.
By the end of 1992, money and currency mar-
kets showed clear signs of a return to normality.
Money market interest rates and interest rate dif-
ferentials against the German mark still stood
above pre-crisis levels, but a downward trend had
been re-established, and net outflows of capital
moderated considerably. Against this background,
the Banco de Portugal announced that the com-
plete liberalisation of capital movements between
residents and non-residents would be effective
from December 16 onwards, two weeks before the
deadline that had been announced in August.
From mid-December 1992 to mid-January 1993,
the escudo benefited from improved sentiment in
foreign exchange markets, reflecting an increased
confidence in monetary union after the Edinburgh
summit, as well as a favourable reaction to the
successful completion of capital movement liber-
alisation by the Portuguese authorities. In the first
two weeks of January, favourable sentiment to-
wards the escudo allowed the Banco de Portugal
to sell escudos in the foreign exchange market.
The authorities used the strengthening of the do-
mestic currency to proceed with the gradual de-
cline of official interest rates. Further interest rate
cuts took place in late January and early February,
but the Banco de Portugal stopped selling escudos
in the foreign exchange market as the upward
pressure on the currency dissipated amid renewed
tensions in the ERM, which would lead to a 10 per
cent devaluation of the central rate of the Irish
pound on 1 February 1993.
From mid-February onwards the sentiment to-
wards the escudo deteriorated again. Downward
pressure on the exchange rate re-emerged and per-
sisted in varying degrees up to mid-May. The es-
cudo was affected by the weakness of the peseta
and by increasing doubts regarding the determi-
nation of the Portuguese authorities to defend
their currency. This erosion of credibility resulted
from the perception of insufficient domestic mac-
roeconomic adjustment and a rapidly deteriorat-
ing economic environment, as well as an increas-
ing tension between the Minister of Finance and
the central bank. While the Banco de Portugal be-
lieved that interest rates should be reduced in a
manner consistent with the preservation of ex-
change rate stability, it was coming under increas-
ing pressure from the government to make use of
the margin of manoeuvre created by the devalua-
tion of the central rate of the escudo in November
1992 and ease monetary conditions considerably.
Despite heavy intervention and tighter liquidity
conditions, the escudo weakened significantly
from mid-January to mid-March, and then stabi-
72 Banco de Portugal / Economic bulletin / December 2003
Articles
(24)Norway, Sweden and Finland had pegged their currencies uni-
laterally to the ECU in October 1990, May 1991 and June 1991,
respectively (Sweden and Finland were not yet members of the
EU). All three Nordic countries experienced great difficulties
in defending their ECU pegs. In November 1991, the Finish
markka suffered from heavy selling pressure in the context of a
severe recession. After a short period of floating, the central
rate against the ECU was devalued by 12.3 per cent on No-
vember 15. On September 8, 1992, the peg of the Finish markka
was abandoned. The peg of the Norwegian Krona lasted until
December 10.
(25)As pointed out by Bento and Gaspar (1993), the realignment
procedure was not initiated by the Portuguese authorities, and
the escudo was not under particularly strong pressure at the
time. However, the devaluation of the central rate of the Span-
ish peseta changed the environment in which the choice of the
central rate of the escudo had to be considered. Spain was one
of Portugal’s main trading partners and an important competi-
tor in third markets. Moreover, both countries had joined the
Community at the same time and were perceived to face simi-
lar adjustment processes.lised around the central rate that had been estab-
lished following the November 1992 realignment
up to mid-May. In contrast with what had hap-
pened in September 1992, when the Banco de Por-
tugal allowed for a significant short-run volatility
of the exchange rate and money market rates, but
kept the exchange rate broadly stable in monthly
average terms, the escudo was now allowed to
gradually depreciate towards the central rate, with
no significant increase in volatility. These different
approaches reflect the very rapid deterioration of
the cyclical position since mid-1992, and also the
fact that in 1993 the authorities could no longer
benefit from segmentation between the domestic
and euro-escudo money markets (which would
imply ceteris paribus the need for tighter domestic
money market conditions to keep the currency sta-
ble).
On May 13, at the start of a regular meeting of
the Monetary Committee, the Spanish authorities
requested the third realignment of the peseta’s
central parity in less than a year, taking the re-
maining Committee members by surprise. In this
context, the Portuguese authorities decided to re-
quest that the central parity of the escudo be also
adjusted. By the end of the day, an agreement had
been reached to devalue the central rate of the pe-
seta by 8 per cent and that of the escudo by 6.5 per
cent. Following the realignment, the escudo ex-
change rate suffered an immediate downward ad-
justment and then stabilised. The stabilisation of
the exchange rate allowed a sharp reduction of of-
ficial interest rates (see Annex 2).
Turbulence returned to the EMS in July 1993,
when several ERM currencies, and particularly the
French franc, came under heavy selling pressure.
The Banco de Portugal increased its official rates
by a much smaller degree than in previous epi-
sodes of tension and made very limited interven-
tions in the foreign exchange market. As a result,
the escudo depreciated significantly. In the second
half of July, the escudo lost about 6 per cent
against the DEM. On 2 August 1993, the ERM fluc-
tuation bands were widened to +15 per cent, with-
out any change to the central parities(26).
Overall, in the year to August 1993, the escudo
depreciated by 10 per cent in nominal effective
terms, and by roughly twice as much against the
German currency. In line with the trend decline of
official interest rates over this period, the average
overnight rate stood at 11 per cent, a 4 p.p. decline.
However, the 3-month interest rate differential
stood at the level observed a year before, reflecting
the maintenance of a substantial risk premium on
the Portuguese currency.
3.3. From the widening of the bands to EMU
(August 1993-December 1998)
The enlargement of the bands was aimed at in-
troducing a “two-way risk” that would discourage
speculation. The Banco de Portugal acted in line
with the strategy pursued by the other ERM cen-
tral banks, and did not exploit the increased room
for manoeuvre provided by the enlarged fluctua-
tion margins. The commitment to exchange rate
stability was constantly re-affirmed by the central
bank, and episodes of pressure were countered
through (at times substantial) interest rate in-
creases and interventions in the foreign exchange
market. While seeking to keep the escudo within
the old 6 per cent margins, the Banco de Portugal
considered it preferable not to specify a target
range for the fluctuation of the escudo, so as to
avoid the emergence of potential focal points for
market pressures. In practice, there was a concern
to keep the escudo from becoming the weakest
currency in the system, so as to minimize exposure
to possible attacks.
From October 1993 to end-February 1994, the
Banco de Portugal was able to gradually reduce its
money market intervention rates. However, in the
second quarter of 1994, the escudo again suffered
from speculative pressure. Tensions reflected un-
certainty regarding the intentions of the Portu-
guese authorities in the context of a delayed eco-
nomic upturn and suspicion that the conflict be-
tween the government and the central bank was
intensifying. Market tensions were particularly in-
tense in early April. The escudo approached its
(former) 6 per cent lower limit against the German
mark prompting the central bank to suspend regu-
lar money market intervention procedures and in-
tervene in the foreign exchange market (Chart 9).
The escudo’s overnight rate climbed to 36 per cent
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(26)The decision to widen the ERM bands was complemented by a
bilateral agreement between the Dutch and German authori-
ties to preserve the former band among the two currencies.on April 7, from about 12 per cent in late March,
and the 3-month differential against the German
mark widened 5 p.p. In late June, the Governor
and 2 Deputy-Governors of the Banco de Portugal
were replaced. At the same time, the Finance min-
ister recognised that a decline of domestic interest
rates could only be achieved in the context of a
sustained reduction of the inflation rate and sus-
tained exchange rate stability(27). This position
marked a welcome departure from previous gov-
ernment calls for lower interest rates. Exchange
rate tensions abated in July, as reflected in the
strengthening of the escudo, the decline of the
overnight rate to the levels prevailing in late Feb-
ruary, and some narrowing of the short-term rate
spread against the German mark. Intervention
rates were reduced in steps, but previous money
market intervention procedures were adjusted in
order to keep the degree of flexibility associated
with variable rate repo operations(28).
In end-1994 and early 1995, instability returned
to the world’s foreign exchange markets, with re-
percussions in the ERM. Instability was associated
to a significant decline of the US dollar against the
German mark, following the Mexican peso crisis
in December 1994. The escudo was negatively af-
fected by pressure on some other ERM currencies,
in particular the peseta, and also by some political
uncertainty in Portugal in the run-up to the Octo-
ber 1995 election. On 6 March 1995, following a re-
quest by the Spanish authorities, the central parity
of the peseta was devalued by 7 per cent. Even if
the escudo was not under selling pressure at the
time, the Portuguese authorities decided to request
a 3.5 per cent devaluation of the central rate of the
escudo, in order to bring it in line with market
rates prevailing since August 1993. At the same
time, the commitment to the objective of exchange
rate stability was re-affirmed. For a brief period of
time after the adjustment of the central parity,
pressure on the escudo intensified, suggesting that
the realignment was not well understood by the
markets. The Banco de Portugal had to resort to
the usual instruments to support the currency.
Subsequently, as tensions abated, and as monetary
easing took place elsewhere in Europe, the Banco
de Portugal began reducing official interest rates
in the summer of 1995. The central bank remained
cautious during the electoral period and until the
1996 budget was approved in March that year. It
thereafter reduced rates more actively.
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(27)See the speech by the Finance Minister Eduardo Catroga, deliv-
ered at the occasion of the nomination of the new members of
the Banco de Portugal Board on 28 June 1994.
(28)On 12 July a (daily) absorption facility was put in place. At the
same time, the Banco de Portugal decided not to resume the
announcement of the rate on the regular supply of liquidity
and instead to continue to supply liquidity through variable
repos. This decision was motivated by the fact that changes to
the rate on the regular provision of liquidity had in the past
tended to attract unwarranted attention undermining the man-
agement of the exchange rate by the central bank. The rates on
the absorption and overnight credit facilities (the latter had
been set up in July 1993) set a corridor for the repo rate, which
became the main instrument to steer money market rates and
signal the stance of monetary policy.From mid-1995 up to the end of 1998 calm con-
ditions generally prevailed in the ERM. In this pe-
riod, most currencies, including the Portuguese es-
cudo, tended to trade close to their respective cen-
tral parities and to show a declining volatility(29).
The trend decline of the German mark against the
dollar in this period, progress at nominal conver-
gence within the European Union and major polit-
ical and institutional achievements regarding the
EMU process were important factors in explaining
the calm conditions that prevailed in the European
foreign exchange markets. At a certain point in
time, a virtuous circle emerged between the
strengthening of nominal convergence and pros-
pects for EMU. The latter benefited in particular
those countries that still faced significant risk
premia, as evidenced by large long-term interest
rate differentials against the German mark. In Por-
tugal, the stability of the nominal exchange rate
since mid-1993, the continuous decline of the infla-
tion rate since the early 1990s and the re-
establishment of a declining path for the budget
deficit as from 1994, allowed a sustained and sig-
nificant reduction of long-term nominal interest
rates from mid-1995 onwards. Average long-term
interest rates declined from a peak of 12.2 per cent
in April 1995 to 4.1 per cent in December 1998.
During the same period the long-term interest rate
differential against the German mark narrowed
from over 5 p.p. to about 0.3 p.p., signalling a sig-
nificant decline of the risk premium of the Portu-
guese currency.
On 2 May 1998, the European Council decided
on the group of countries that would adopt the
euro as from January 1999(30). On the same date,
the Ministers and Central Bank Governors of those
countries announced that the ERM bilateral central
parities would be used in determining the official
ECU (and therefore the euro) conversion rates on
31 December 1998. Central banks committed to en-
sure “through appropriate market techniques”
that on the last day of the year, i.e., on 31 Decem-
ber 1998, market rates would be equal to the cen-
tral parities. The announcement of a terminal con-
dition to the exchange rate path and the prospect
of convergence to a common intervention rate led
to a smooth convergence of the currencies of the
future euro area countries towards their respective
central parities. In this period, and in contrast with
previous occasions of tension in world financial
markets, significant instability at the global level
— linked to the Asian and Russian crises — did
not affect the functioning of the ERM. The conver-
gence of official interest rates was basically com-
pleted on 3 December, when the central banks of
the future euro area countries decided to cut their
respective intervention rates in different degrees,
so as to set them at 3.0 per cent(31).
The significant degree of monetary easing in
the run-up to EMU provided a huge stimulus to
domestic demand growth in Portugal at the turn
of the century. Demand growth was fuelled by ris-
ing indebtedness and a widening current account
deficit, as the private sector adjusted to perma-
nently lower (nominal and real) interest rate
levels. As had happened in 1990-91, excess de-
mand in the economy was exacerbated by a pro-
cyclical fiscal policy. Indeed, even if lower interest
payments allowed for a steady reduction of the
overall budget deficit as a per cent of GDP, interest
savings were to a large extent used to finance extra
current expenditure. As a result, the cumulative
deterioration of the cyclically-adjusted primary
balance exceeded 3 p.p. of GDP in the period
1995-2001(32). This expansionary stance of fiscal
policy added to rising imbalances in the economy
in the early years of EMU, making the subsequent
adjustment process more painful.
4. CONCLUSION
This article reviewed the experience of the Por-
tuguese escudo in the exchange rate mechanism of
the European Monetary System in the period
1992-1998. The Portuguese experience may pro-
vide useful insights to the acceding countries as
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(29)The Irish pound was a notable exception. It has in general been
appreciated relative to its central parities against the other
ERM currencies, and exhibited significant volatility. On 16
March 1998, the Irish pound was revalued by 3 per cent.
(30)These countries were Germany, France, Italy, Spain, The Neth-
erlands, Belgium, Austria, Portugal, Ireland, Finland and
Luxembourg.
(31)Italy was the only exception. Its discount rate was first set at 3.5
per cent, and then lowered to 3.0 per cent on 23 December
1998.
(32)Data are from the European Commission. On the use of inter-
est savings to finance current expenditure, see the article by
Claudia Braz and Jorge Correia da Cunha published in the cur-
rent issue of the Economic Bulletin.they consider applying for ERM II membership.
Indeed, a number of similarities can be found be-
tween the Portuguese economy prior to ERM ac-
cession and the current situation in many of those
countries, including the need to make further
progress on nominal convergence; the fact that ac-
ceding countries are in a catching-up process, and
thus face a tendency for an equilibrium apprecia-
tion of their real exchange rates; and the exposure
of these countries to volatile capital flows, which
poses difficult challenges for the conduct of mone-
tary policy.
In the case of Portugal, the ERM has proved a
useful framework to pursue the disinflation pro-
cess initiated in the mid-1980s, and to foster mac-
roeconomic stability more generally. During the
period of ERM membership, inflation declined
steadily from 11 to the 2-3 per cent range, and the
differential against the EU average was virtually
eliminated.
Somewhat surprisingly, the credibility of the
commitment by the Portuguese authorities to-
wards exchange rate and price stability was not
significantly hurt by the nominal depreciation of
the escudo during the turmoil that affected Euro-
pean exchange markets in 1992/93. This probably
reflects the fact that the escudo realignments took
place in a context of systemic adjustments, and
were likely regarded as unavoidable in the context
of the devaluations of the Spanish peseta central
rate. In addition, the determination showed by the
Banco de Portugal to maintain high interest rates
in defence of the escudo, and to penalise specula-
tors after episodes of exchange rate pressure, has
strengthened the central bank anti-inflation cre-
dentials. Finally, a sharp deceleration of economic
activity in the second half of 1992 and in 1993
helped contain the transmission of the deprecia-
tion to domestic prices. After the enlargement of
the ERM bands, the successful preservation of ex-
change rate stability by the central bank, and re-
newed efforts at fiscal consolidation in 1994, an-
chored expectations preventing a rebound of infla-
tion as the Portuguese economy recovered from
the 1993 recession. From 1995 onwards, progress
towards nominal convergence enhanced the likeli-
hood of compliance with the EMU convergence
criteria, while at the same time the prospect of
EMU participation facilitated exchange rate stabil-
ity, the convergence of interest rates to the lowest
levels in the EU and the improvement of the fiscal
balance. As a result, Portugal was in a position to
be one of the eleven founding members of the euro
area in January 1999.
This overall success of the Portuguese experi-
ence in the convergence period hides inadequate
developments in a number of areas — particularly
in the fiscal policy domain — with negative conse-
quences for the economy after the adoption of the
euro. Indeed, while the (inevitable) monetary
stimulus in the run-up to EMU called for some fis-
cal policy tightening that would attenuate the im-
pact of interest rate declines on private domestic
demand, fiscal policy was instead clearly pro-
cyclical. The expansionary stance of fiscal policy
contributed to rising imbalances in the economy in
the early years of EMU, making the subsequent
adjustment more painful.
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Annex 1
THE PORTUGUESE ESCUDO IN THE ERM
Chronology of the main developments
1992
April 4........... T h ePortuguese authorities apply for ERM membership
April 6........... T h ePortuguese escudo joins the ERM wide band (±6 per cent); central rate against the ECU
set at 178.735 escudos per ECU
June 2 ........... Maastricht Treaty rejected in Danish referendum
August 13........ Full capital movement liberalization announced
September 13..... 7p e rcent devaluation of the Italian lira central rate
September 16..... British membership of the ERM suspended
Italian authorities temporarily suspended foreign exchange market intervention obligations
5 per cent devaluation of the Spanish peseta central rate
November 23..... 6p e rcent devaluation of the Spanish peseta and Portuguese escudo central rates
December 16 ..... Liberalization of capital movements completed
1993
February 1 ....... 1 0p e rcent of the Irish pound central rate
M a y1 3.......... 8p e rcent devaluation of the Spanish peseta central rate
August 2......... Enlargement of ERM fluctuation bands to ±15 per cent
1995
March 6 ......... E S Pcentral rate devalued by 7 per cent
PTE central rate devalued by 3.5 per cent
1998...............
M a y2........... T h eEuropean Council decides that Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium,
Austria, Portugal, Ireland, Finland and Luxembourg will adopt the euro as from January 1,
1999
The Ministers of Finance and central bank Governors of the future euro area countries an-
nounce that ERM bilateral central parities will be used to determine the euro conversion rates
on December 31
December 3 ...... Intervention rates of future euro area countries set at 3 per cent in a concerted move
December 31 ..... Announcement of conversion rates into euro. PTE converted at 200.482 PTE per euro.Banco de Portugal / Economic bulletin / December 2003 79
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Annex 2






















03-Apr-92. . . 15.625 18.9375 26-May-94 . . Suspended Suspended Suspended
06-Apr-92. . . 15.375 17.9375 12-Jul-94.... 11.000 11.5625 13.500
13-Jul-92.... 15.250 17.7500 19-Jul-94.... 11.2500
12-Aug-92 . . 15.000 17.0000 26-Jul-94.... 10.500 10.7500 13.000
19-Aug-92 . . 14.000 16.0000 4-Aug-94 . . . 9.750 10.5000 12.500
21-Sep-92. . . Suspended Suspended 19-Aug-94 . . 10.3750
12-Oct-92 . . . 14.000 26-Aug-94 . . 9.250 10.0000 12.000
26-Nov-92 . . Suspended 5-Sep-94.... 9.7500
04-Dec-92. . . 14.000 12-Sep-94. . . 9.5000
05-Jan-93 . . . 13.625 19-Sep-94. . . 8.750 9.2500 11.500
12-Jan-93 . . . 13.250 4-Oct-94 .... 9.1250
19-Jan-03 . . . 13.000 19-Oct-94 . . . 9.0000
12-Feb-93 . . . 12.750 26-Oct-94 . . . 8.500 8.8750
26-Feb-93 . . . 13.000 13-Mar-95 . . 11.2500
12-Mar-93 . . 13.500 20-Mar-95 . . 10.7500
19-Mar-93 . . Suspended 27-Mar-95 . . 9.0000
04-May-93 . . 17.000 26-May-95 . . 8.8750
19-May-93 . . 13.000 14-Aug-95 . . 8.7500
26-May-93 . . 12.000 28-Aug-95 . . 8.250 11.000
14-Jun-93 . . . 11.250 19-Dec-95. . . 7.7500 8.5000 10.5000
21-Jun-93 . . . 11.000 12-Jan-96 . . . 8.3750
28-Jun-93 . . . 10.500 19-Jan-96 . . . 8.2500
05-Jul-93.... 10.250 5-Feb-96 .... 8.1250
12-Jul-93.... 11.2500 12.0000 19-Feb-96 . . . 8.0000
26-Jul-93.... Suspended Suspended 14.5000 12-Mar-96 . . 7.5000 7.9000 10.2500
04-Aug-93 . . 13.0000 26-Mar-96 . . 7.8000
12-Aug-93 . . 12.7500 12-Apr-96. . . 7.2000 7.6000 9.5000
19-Aug-93 . . 12.5000 19-Apr-96. . . 6.8000 7.5000 9.0000
26-Aug-93 . . 12.3750 6-May-96 . . . 7.5000
13-Sep-93. . . 12.2500 26-Aug-96 . . 7.2500
19-Oct-93 . . . 12.1250 4-Oct-96 .... 7.1000
26-Oct-93 . . . 10.375 11.3750 12.0000 21-Oct-96 . . . 7.0000
19-Nov-93 . . 10.250 11.2500 4-Nov-96 . . .
6-Dec-93.... 10.125 11.1250 19-Nov-96 . . 6.4000 6.9000 8.5000
13-Dec-93. . . 10.000 11.0000 19-Dec-96. . . 6.2000 6.7000 8.3000
04-Jan-94 . . . 9.875 10.8750 13-Jan-97 . . . 6.5000
12-Jan-94 . . . 9.750 10.7500 14-Apr-97. . . 5.8000 6.3000 7.8000
19-Jan-94 . . . 11.5000 12-May-97 . . 5.7000 6.0000 7.7000
26-Jan-94 . . . 9.500 10.5000 11.5000 14-Jul-97.... 5.4000 5.7000 7.4000
4-Feb-94 .... 9.250 10.2500 11.5000 19-Aug-97 . . 5.2000 5.5000 7.2000
14-Feb-94 . . . 9.125 10.1250 11.5000 19-Nov-97 . . 4.9000 5.3000 6.9000
21-Feb-94 . . . 9.000 10.0000 11.5000 19-Jan-98 . . . 4.8000 5.1000 6.8000
04-Mar-94 . . 11.0000 26-Feb-98 . . . 4.6000 4.9000 6.6000
31-Mar-94 . . 13.0000 19-Mar-98 . . 4.4000 4.7000 6.4000
05-Apr-94. . . Suspended Suspended 12-May-98 . . 4.2000 4.5000 6.2000
19-Apr-94. . . 11.0000 12.0000 12-Oct-98 . . . 3.7000 4.0000 5.7000
04-May-94 . . 10.000 04-Nov-98 . . 3.5000 3.7500 5.5000
12-May-94 . . 9.750 10.7500 11.7500 04-Dec-98. . . 2.7500 3.0000 4.7500
19-May-94 . . 9.375 10.3750 11.3750 29-Dec-98. . . 3.2500